

Agenda - 19 March 1968

1. Review security record card prepared by Office of Security.
2. Discuss the various compartmented clearances and how they should be noted on the security record card (updating for new clearances to be accomplished by Form 2018a).
3. Record of conveyance of classified information to members.
4. Committee briefing records.

20 March 68

Notes for SSC Meeting with OLC
Scheduled 1400 hours, Mr. Warner's Office

Participants from SSC: [REDACTED]

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Participants from OLC: Warner, [REDACTED]

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AGENDA

Statement of Purpose

Discussion on format and procedures with which
record can be maintained of which individuals have been
told what compartmented intelligence.

BASIC ELEMENTS

Elected officials of the U.S. Government are not
investigated by CIA as a condition of access to
intelligence material. Staff officers on the "Hill" are
not included in this basic concept.

It is still incumbent upon OLC and OS to maintain
a current record of which elected officials are given
intelligence information.

*Compartmented Security Systems
Clearances*

DEFINITIONS

There are three elements now considered integral parts of a security clearance in the compartmented intelligence field.

1. Clearability - Determined by the Office of Security based upon assessment of available records against a security criteria.
2. Need-to-Know Determinations -
Submitted by the unit requesting clearance and approved or rejected by

(a) for SI - The C/SISS

(b) for TK - The TALENT Control Officer, CIA

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(c) for [REDACTED] Projects

I, O - OSA/DDS&T

C, G(DOR), QUI, RH, HX - OSP/DDS&T

EP - C/SMS/DDS&T

or for all

The SAFSS

- (d) Que
3. Security Indoctrination, including the written acknowledgment of an agreement on secrecy.

These three elements are operative each and every time an incremented access to compartmented information is desired by the unit sponsoring or requesting approval.

2018a

There is a form used by the intelligence community in community in carrying out this procedure. It is called the 2018a.

The 2018a is made out by the requesting unit, then:

-----sent to CIB

-----sent to the OS Investigative Division

-----sent to appropriate need-to-know authority

-----sent to the requesting unit asking that the subject be briefed and that CIB be informed of when the briefing took place (this is usually done by forwarding to CIB a copy of the signed secrecy agreement^{**})

-----the OLC has historically be responsible for conducting this security indoctrination with staff members with some incidents where the SSC has conducted the security indoctrination at request of and in company with a member of the OLC.

(Example- [REDACTED] request) STATINTL

CIB

The Office of Security maintains a central repository where all individuals with TK clearances are listed:

-----all individuals given SI by CIA

-----all individuals given [REDACTED] clearances STATINTL

CIB (Continued)

The CIB is the authorized point for checking all compartmented clearances of members of civilian agencies of government.

The CIB is the authorized point for relaying certification of clearances on those individuals whose clearances are held by CIA.

EXAMPLE When Staff member of Subcommittee on Investigations travels to Japan and desires physical access to a military area where an SI clearance is required to get in, then the military unit sends back a request to DIA and CIA asking if the individual has an approved SI clearance. If CIA holds the clearance, CIB sends out certification of this fact to the military unit in Japan and the staff member is allowed access.

This procedure is required by law and there is very little room for modification of procedures.

IBM Printout

A monthly CIB issue of cleared people.

With these basic definitions in mind and serving as the sub-structure of Security's current "clearance" procedure, the following proposals are made to accomplish the goals of the meeting.

PROPOSALS

OFFICE OF SECURITY

- A. That it be the responsibility of the Office of Security to review its clearance records on "staff" personnel and present the results to the OLC. This review will point out those individuals with completed clearance action and those with partially completed action (perhaps largest factor in this element will be cases where no secrecy agreements were signed)* and those on whom there is no clearance action recorded of any nature.
- B. The CIB/OS will serve as the main point within OS to record clearance status and to certify clearances on "Hill" staff personnel.
- C. The CIB will provide on a monthly basis a copy of the IBM printout to OLC.
- D. OS will prepare an updated card system based on input by OLC.

*In those cases where no secrecy oath is located in the OS files an individual will be listed as not having signed an oath.

PROPOSALS (Continued)

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

A. The OLC will be responsible for assisting the OS in updating clearance records.

1. OLC will review the OS list of clearances and add to or delete from it according to their knowledge of the circumstances.

2. OLC will take any action necessary to complete "clearance" procedures with the exceptions that:

(a) ~~No~~ 2018a will be required on staff individuals known to have had past exposure to compartmented intelligence.

(b) When in the determination of the OLC it would not be politic to "pick up" secrecy agreements, the OLC will prepare a note for the C/CIB stating that the individual has been given access to the particular information and that a signed secrecy agreement was not obtained.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL (Continued)

- B. OLC will originate a new 2018a whenever a staff member is given clearly definable increment in compartmented information and on receiving notification from CIB of completed processing, will conduct a security indoctrination.
- C. OLC will review and update the OS IBM printout of clearance.
- D. OLC will provide the SSC with information necessary to keep the card record up to date on what compartmented information is made available to elected representatives.

clearance vs. oath
date should be date clearance was
granted not date of agreement
we have a number of Hill people
who never signed agreements

How come no



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Due clearances

19 Feb. memo

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3/58
Oct 59
Q '61

memo from
us to SO to
process Q for

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in counsel
w/ Del Briefings

~~SECRET~~


19 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John S. Warner,
Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : "Q" Clearances

A check with [REDACTED] Division of Security,
Atomic Energy Commission, reveals that the following "Q"
clearances are registered at AEC:

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

25X1A

There is no record of a "Q" clearance for [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

[REDACTED]

25X1A

Chief, Special Security Center

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John S. Warner,
Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : "Q" Clearances


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25X1A

25X1A



~~SECRET~~



SECRET

[REDACTED]

25X1A

There is no record of a "Q" clearance for [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED]

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

Chief, Special Security Center

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UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS			DATE	
1	Mr. John S. Warner, Legislative Counsel				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>Mr. Warner - I have noted on sheets in clearance staff book. <i>Maie</i></p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
[Redacted]				2/19/68	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

25X1A

25X1A

STATINTL

App

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